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ABSTRACT
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) are major actors of the
current telecommunication ecosystem. Our goal in this pa-
per is to study their impact on other actors of the sup-
ply chain, especially on content innovation which is a key
concern in the network neutrality debate where CDNs’ role
seems forgotten. Our findings indicate that vertically in-
tegrating a CDN helps Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
collect fees from Content Providers (CPs), hence circum-
venting the interdiction of side payments coming from net-
neutrality rules. However, this outcome is socially much
better in terms of user quality and innovation fostering than
having separate actors providing the access and CDN ser-
vices: in the latter case double marginalization (both ISP
and CDN trying to get some value from the supply chain)
leads to suboptimal investments in CDN storage capacities
and higher prices for CPs, resulting in reduced innovation.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Computer Systems Organization]: Computer-
Communication Networks—Network Operations
General Terms
Economics, Neutrality, CDNs, Innovation
1. INTRODUCTION
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) are organizations of
large distributed systems of servers positioned at the edges
of the Internet network. Thanks to this placement of servers
closer to users, content can be delivered with higher avail-
ability and better performances. In addition, because the
most downloaded content is often chosen to be cached at
the edges, the load on the Internet network is reduced.
CDNs have become key player of the Internet, serving an
important proportion of content [7]. For example Akamai,
one of the leaders, manages a network of around 170, 000
servers worldwide and has made a revenue of more than
US$1.5 billion in 2013.
While there is a lot of research activity on CDN caching
strategies at servers from a technical point of view [1], the
activity on CDN economics is more limited and rather fo-
cuses on price optimization strategies for the CDN [4, 5],
or on cost-minimizing CDN cache deployment strategies in
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Internet AS-level topologies [3]. Very few works exist on
the other hand on the economic impact of CDNs on the
whole Internet ecosystem. Though, this economic impact is
worth studying, especially in the era of the vivid network
neutrality debate. Among the focuses of this debate are the
payments from distant content providers (CPs) to ISPs (the
so-called side payments), with service differentiation–if not
blocking–when those payments are not settled. This threat
has triggered a lot of reactions and discussions about how
the network should be ruled, and the FCC took a strong
stance in February 2015 to prevent such practices. But sur-
prisingly, CDNs have not been included in the debate, while
they ease the pressure on ISPs (one of the claims of ISPs
being that they could not afford upgrading the capacity of
their network without side payments from CPs whose flows
saturate their links) and could on the other hand themselves
introduce some differentiation, which may look unfair and
against the neutrality principles (although not against recent
rules). This issue is discussed in [6]. In [8], the impact of
economic strategies of a CDN is investigated and illustrated
to indeed lead to differences of treatment among CPs.
One of the main arguments of neutrality proponents is
that side payments from ISPs would reduce content innova-
tion because of an increased economic strain. We particu-
larly aim in this paper at investigating the impact of CDN
on content innovation (for example, content was considered
fixed in [8]). The questions we would like to answer are:
1) What is the impact of CDNs on content innovation with
respect to a no-CDN situation? 2) What is the impact on
other actors (ISPs, demand from users, quality)? 3) Should
ISPs propose their own CDN service and would that replace
the side payments without breaking the neutrality rules? 4)
What is the best solution for content providers and users, an
integrated CDN or an independent one not colluding with
ISPs?
The next sections propose a model to answer those ques-
tions, where we analyze and compare three cases: no CDN,
a vertically integrated CDN (or in other words, a CDN col-
laborating with the ISP), and a non-cooperative interaction
between a CDN and an ISP. The non-cooperative CDN be-
ing an intermediary between CPs and the ISP, the case when
it has no storage capacity is also considered for comparison
purposes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the model that we will use, Section 3 describes the
outcomes of the three different situations and the order of
decisions, and Section 4 tries to answer the above questions
by analyzing the respective outcomes.
2. MODEL
We consider the model displayed in Figure 1 representing
the supply chain and relations between the main actors of
the Internet: content/application providers, CDNs, ISPs,
and end users.
Content/Applications (mass n)
ISPs
No service
Set of end users (mass D)
CDN
q
p
Figure 1: Representation of relations between users,
ISPs, CDN and CPs
Users and content providers are treated as a continuum,
meaning that no individual user (or individual piece of con-
tent) has an impact on the system (i.e., they are assumed
infinitesimal).
Figure 1 also displays the payments: CPs pay the CDN for
delivering content (subscription price q per unit of content),
users pay ISPs for access (subscription price p per unit of
users). In this formulation, the price paid by CPs to CDNs
is independent of the content being cached or not; indeed,
CPs are not clearly aware of what is cached, they pay the
CDN for delivering their content, but the CDN has a posi-
tive externality in caching content, since increasing quality
and as an indirect consequence the number of customers. In
turn, this may also induce more CPs subscribing to the ser-
vice. Another induced assumption in our model is that ISPs
let CDNs freely install servers at the edge of their network,
a situation observed in practice for some ISPs with CDNs
reducing the load on ISPs’ architecture and that content
providers only deal with CDNs.
The next subsections characterize the behavior of each of
the four classes of actors described in Figure 1.
2.1 Users
We consider a standard discrete choice model, more ex-
actly a logit one, for both (infinitesimal) end users and CPs,
having the choice between subscribing to the service or not.
The choice is then between two options, made of a valua-
tion for each option plus a Gumbel random variable (r.v.).
More on this type of user modeling can be found in [2]; it is
adapted here to our context.
For an end user, the (random) valuation for subscribing
to the service is assumed to be
vu = k ln(1/p) + lnQ+ lnn+ κs,
to be compared to the valuation for choosing no service:
k ln(1/p0) + κ0. In this formulation,
• κs and κ0 are i.i.d. Gumbel random variables repre-
senting variations among users in the service percep-
tion;
• the valuation decreases with the service price p, k being
a sensitivity parameter that we assume strictly larger
than 1;
• it also increases with the quality Q per download and
the mass n of content. Indeed, better quality and more
choices of content induce an increased level of satisfac-
tion.
The logarithm function that we use comes from the Weber-
Fechner law describing the relationship between the magni-
tude of a physical stimulus and its perceived intensity within
the human sensory system, that was also observed to be
valid for quality perception of network services [10].
The probability of choosing to subscribe is then (see [2] for
details) (1/p)
kQn
(1/p)kQn+(1/p0)k
, that we multiply by D, the fixed
base mass of users, to get the mass d of end users actually
subscribing:
d = D
(1/p)kQn
(1/p)kQn+ (1/p0)k
. (1)
2.2 Content/Applications
Like for users, we consider a discrete-choice model for CPs;
the valuation for subscribing to the (CDN) service is here
vc = l ln(1/q) + ln d + κc, that is compared to the valua-
tion of no subscription: l ln(1/q0) + κ0. Again, κc and κ0
are independent Gumbel random variables still represent-
ing the variations among content providers. The valuation
decreases with price q, l being a sensitivity parameter (as-
sumed strictly above 1), and increases with the mass d of
end users because more end users induces more business op-
portunities. There is no direct dependence on quality here
(the quality is experienced by users), but an indirect one
because a better quality means more customers.
If the base mass of CPs is N , the actual mass of CPs in
action is
n = N
(1/q)ld
(1/q)ld+ (1/q0)l
. (2)
It is this quantity n that we will consider as an indicator for
innovation.
2.3 ISP’s utility
We consider a single ISP. Its utility is its revenue:
Ri = dp. (3)
Operational costs are assumed negligible, and the infras-
tructure already existing. The goal of the ISP will be to
determine the price p maximizing Ri.
2.4 CDN revenue and quality of service
The CDN is also playing on its price q in order to maxi-
mize its revenue Rc, defined by
Rc = nq − `C, (4)
where ` is the price per unit of server capacity C. Costs of
transits to caches are assumed negligible.
The CDN activity induces a better quality perceived by
users (as represented in their valuation). The quality of
service per download seen by users is a function of capac-
ity C: we assume the quality is 1 for the cached content,
and δ < 1 for the uncached one. Let F be the cumulative
distribution function (cdf) of popularity of content and F¯
the complementary cdf. Thus F¯ (x) gives the proportion of
content with popularity (number of downloads per unit of
time) at least x. F¯−1(y) is then the number of downloads
per unit of time of the yth most popular unit of content.
But the most popular contents are cached, representing a
proportion min(1, C/n), the average quality per download
is thus
Q = 1 · P + δ · (1− P ) with P =
∫ C/n
y=0
F¯−1(y)dy∫ 1
0
F¯−1(y)dy
, (5)
where P is the probability that a given request is served
from the cache. In our numerical section, we will take F as
an exponential cdf with rate η, so that F−1(y) = (−y ln y+
y)/η and Q =
(
δ + (1− δ)C
n
(
1− ln C
n
))
, which is actually
independent of the parameter η.
3. ANALYSIS
Let us now specify the order of decisions. We assume that
(i) At the largest time scale, the CDN and ISP fix the prices
and caching capacity; (ii) at the smallest time scale the mass
of content/applications and users are decided.
This is solved by backward induction: CDN and ISP make
their choice anticipating the impact on content and users.
3.1 Determining the masses of content and
users for fixed prices
At the smallest time scale, we have the system of equations
on n and d (with p, C and q fixed) given by (1) and (2),
where Q depends on n as in (5).
This leads to the fixed-point equation in n
n = N
(1/q)lD (1/p)
kQn
(1/p)kQn+(1/p0)k
(1/q)lD (1/p)
kQn
(1/p)kQn+(1/p0)k
+ (1/q0)l
(6)
with Q again given in (5). For this equation, the left-hand
side is increasing starting from 0. The right-hand side is
also starting from 0, so that (n = 0, d = 0) is a (trivial)
solution. Indeed, if no user, no interest to produce content,
and reciprocally.
If we exclude the solution at n = 0, this fixed-point equa-
tion seems intractable analytically, but it can easily be solved
numerically. Figure 2 draws the right- and left-hand sides
of the equation for k = 2, l = 2, p0 = 3 q0 = 1, p = 1,
q = 2, D = 10, N = 10, C = 3, δ = 0.6 so that Q = 1 when
n < C, Q = (0.6+(1−0.6)(−C
n
ln C
n
+ C
n
) when n > C (those
values will be used throughout the paper). We get here an
intersection point different from (0, 0) at n = 7.1081.
Remark that here the equilibrium (0, 0) is not stable in the
sense that a small increase in n or d would put the values
n or d above the equilibrium, inducing further increases of
the values; this can be seen from the derivative of the red
(solid) curve being larger than 1 at that equilibrium1. On
the other hand, (n = 7.1081, d = 9.83193) is locally stable:
small variations of d and n lead back to that point, because
the dashed curve has a derivative smaller than 1.
The values of n and d being determined that way for any
combination of p, q and C, the next section considers the
determination of the latter values at the larger time scale.
1computing the derivative of this curve, it can be shown
that (0, 0) is a stable equilibrium if ND < 1
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Figure 2: Determination of the solution for n
from (6) when prices and capacity C are fixed.
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Figure 3: Best-response functions when C = 0
3.2 Selection of prices and caching capacity
At the largest time scale, prices p and q and capacity C
can be decided knowing the resulting values of n and d. We
consider three situations: 1) C = 0 (no caching), q being
decided by the ISP; 2) the CDN and ISP cooperate as in
the case of a vertical integration of services; 3) the CDN
and ISP play a non-cooperative game on their decisions, so
that we look for a Nash equilibrium. For that latter case, we
will consider both the case without caching from the CDN
(who is then just an intermediary) and the case where the
CDN decides the caching capacity.
3.2.1 Without CDN
In this case C = 0 and q is actually decided by the ISP,
that is, the CPs need to connect to the ISP. We look for
maxp,q>0(dp+ nq).
With the above values for parameters, a maximum rev-
enue maxp,q>0(dp+ nq) = 42.12 is at (p = 5.92, q = 1.09).
3.2.2 Cooperation between the CDN and the ISP
This happens when the CDN and the ISP are vertically
integrated. We look for maxp,q,C>0(dp+ nq − `C).
Still with the above parameter values, we get a maximum
value of 46.43 obtained at (p = 7.47, q = 1.06, C = 3.31).
3.2.3 Pricing game between the CDN and the ISP
First, assume that the CDN is just acting as an access ser-
vice to CPs, but does not cache anything, i.e., plays on q but
with C = 0. Figure 3 displays the best-response functions.
We clearly see a unique Nash equilibrium (intersection point
of the two best-response curves) at (p = 4.74, q = 2.03).
Now assume that the CDN decides its storage capacity C
at the same time as its price q, and also at the same time the
ISP sets p. We again have a game, but now the CDN has
two decision variables. For our example parameter set, the
equilibrium is for p = 4.92, q = 2.04, C = 0.126, obtained
after performing successive best-responses from alternating
actors (the so-called fictitious play [9], that leads to a stable
equilibrium). That equilibrium yields revenue 28.64 to the
ISP and 11.77 to the CDN.
4. IMPACT
Figure 4 compares the outcomes for our model when the
user sensitivity to price k varies, the other values being those
taken so far. We can make the following observations:
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Figure 4: Effect of user price sensitivity k
1. Comparing the case without caching with that of an
integrated CDN, despite the cost of capacity caching brings
an increase of about 10% of revenue. Caching increases the
subscription price of users, and decreases that of CPs. Inno-
vation (mass of content) is slightly larger when caching, but
it is not the case of the number users despite the increased
quality, due to the larger subscription fee.
2. Comparing the case where the CDN is just an access
provider to CPs (with C = 0) to the case where this is han-
dled by the ISP itself, quite surprisingly the integrated case
leads to much more content (around +40% for our values)
than competition. The effect on user demand is smaller, and
not always in the same direction.
3. An independent and non-cooperative CDN leads to a
much smaller caching capacity and a worse QoE than the
integrated case.
4. The best situation in terms of content mass among
all scenarios is that of an integrated CDN for our (above)
values, but can be the no-CDN situation if users are very
sensitive to prices. The difference is quite drastic with re-
spect to an independent CDN.
5. To discuss the difference between caching (and ask-
ing subscription from CPs) and side payments, the latter
correspond to the “no CDN” scenario, and the former to the
“integrated CDN” case. Caching (integrated CDN) increases
the provider’s revenue and reduces the load on the network
architecture from the ISP point of view. In this sense, it
allows to circumvent the side payment proposal. But as
we said, this also increases quality and mass of content at
a limited cost in terms of users’ subscription, meaning that
regulatory bodies and user associations can hardly complain
about the situation, unless using other types of arguments.
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